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1. Introduction 
 
According to Kyle P. Stanford (2006, p. 19), “the history of scientific inquiry itself offers a 
straightforward rationale for thinking that there typically are alternatives to our best theories 
equally well confirmed by the evidence, even when we are unable to conceive of them at the 
time.” Stanford (2001, p. S9) calls this the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives (PUA), which 
in turn provides the inductive basis for 
 
the following New Induction over the History of Science: that we have, throughout the 
history of scientific inquiry and in virtually every field, repeatedly occupied an epistemic 
position in which we could conceive of only one or a few theories that were well-
confirmed by the available evidence, while subsequent history of inquiry has routinely (if 
not invariably) revealed further, radically distinct alternatives as well-confirmed by the 
previously available evidence as those we were inclined to accept on the strength of that 
evidence (emphasis added). 
 
As K. Brad Wray (2018, p. 82) points out, “Stanford’s argument, unlike the reductio ad 
absurdum attributed to Laudan, is a genuine inductive argument” (emphasis added; see also 
Wray 2015, p. 68). Again, as Stanford (2006, p. 45) himself puts it, “The new induction provides 
a pure and simple inductive argument for the claim that we have repeatedly and characteristically 
occupied a significant underdetermination predicament, failing even to conceive of theoretical 
alternatives well confirmed by the available evidence that would later be embraced by actual 
scientists and scientific communities” (emphasis added). 
 
Stanford’s New Induction over the History of Science can be reconstructed as follows 
(Magnus 2010, p. 807): 
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 A New Induction over the History of Science (NIS) 
 
NIS-1 The historical record reveals that past scientists typically failed to conceive of 
alternatives to their favorite, then-successful theories. 
NIS-2 So, present scientists fail to conceive of alternatives to their favorite, now-
successful theories. 
NIS-3 Therefore, we should not believe our best present (scientific) theories insofar as 
they are the result of eliminative inference.1 
 
Now, I (Mizrahi 2014; 2016a) have argued that a problem parallel to the PUA applies to the 
history of Western Philosophy, namely, the Problem of Unconceived Objections (PUO). 
Consequently, if Stanford’s NIS is a cogent inductive argument, then the following is a cogent 
inductive argument as well: 
 
 A New Induction over the History of Philosophy (NIP) 
 
NIP-1 The historical record reveals that past philosophers typically failed to conceive of 
serious objections to their favorite, then-defensible theories. 
NIP-2 So, present philosophers fail to conceive of serious objections to their favorite, 
now-defensible theories. 
NIP-3 Therefore, we should not believe our best present (philosophical) theories insofar 
as [their defensibility is due in part to serious objections being unconceived]. (Mizrahi 
2016a, p. 62) 
 
Given the parallels between Stanford’s PUA and the PUO, and those between Stanford’s NIS 
and the NIP, I have sketched the following reductio against Stanford’s NIS (Mizrahi 2016a, pp. 
63-64): 
 
(1) Stanford’s NIS is a cogent argument against scientific realism. [Assumption for reductio] 
(2) If Stanford's NIS is a cogent argument against scientific realism, then the NIP is a cogent 
argument against philosophical realism. 
(3) The NIP is a cogent argument against philosophical realism. [from (1) & (2)] 
(4) If the NIP is a cogent argument against philosophical realism, then, if scientific 
antirealism is a philosophical theory, we should not believe it. 
(5) If scientific antirealism is a philosophical theory, we should not believe it. [from (3) & 
(4)] 
(6) Scientific antirealism is a scientific theory. 
(7) We should not believe scientific antirealism. [from (5) & (6)] 
 
If this reductio is sound, then it clearly poses a problem for the “Stanfordite,” to borrow Greg 
Frost-Arnold’s (2016) term. For the Stanfordite surely accepts the PUA and the NIS as a cogent 
argument against scientific realism. Yet, this very argument against scientific realism has the 
following (absurd) consequence: that we should not believe scientific antirealism. Clearly, this is 
                                               
1 Inductive arguments from a sample, such as the NIS, are strong just in case they are based on representative, 
random samples; otherwise, they are fallacious. See Mizrahi (2015). 
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a consequence of the PUA and the NIS that the Stanfordite cannot accept, since the Stanfordite is 
a scientific antirealist insofar as he thinks that we should not believe our best present scientific 
theories (see NIS-3).2 
 
Now, Fabio Sterpetti (2018) seeks to defend Stanford’s NIS from my reductio, but he 
misconstrues my argument against Stanford’s NIS. In what follows, I will address this 
misconstrual of my argument against Stanford’s NIS. I will argue that antirealists who endorse 
Stanford’s NIS still face the following absurd consequence of this argument (reductio, not a 
dilemma): that, by their own lights, they should not believe their own brand of scientific 
antirealism. 
 
2. Setting the record straight: reductio vs. dilemma 
 
Sterpetti (2018) seeks to defend Stanford’s NIS from my reductio, but he misconstrues my 
argument against Stanford’s NIS. According to Sterpetti (2018, pp. 4-5): 
 
Mizrahi (2016[a]) develops an argument against Stanford’s Position (SP), according to 
which, if (1) one assumes that Stanford’s argument against scientific realism is a cogent 
argument, and (2) it is possible to adopt Stanford’s own line of reasoning in the field of 
philosophy, then one finds oneself trapped into a dilemma. Indeed, either (a) SP is a 
scientific position, or (b) SP is not a scientific position, i.e., it is a philosophical position. 
According to Mizrahi, whichever horn of the dilemma one takes, one should not trust SP 
in the light of Stanford’s own line of reasoning (emphasis in original). 
 
There are a few problems with the way in which Sterpetti has presented my argument against 
Stanford’s NIS. First, he does not say what SP is exactly, but I think he equates it with something 
that he later labels (SA), namely, “Scientific realism is not true, thus scientific theories are not 
(approximately) true” (Sterpetti 2018, p. 5). He then claims that my “reconstruction of SA is, to 
say the least, quite unfair” (Sterpetti 2018, p. 5). 
 
Contrary to what Sterpetti seems to think, however, I do not take Stanford’s brand of 
scientific antirealism to be something like (SA).3 In fact, I explicitly say that I take scientific 
antirealism on the epistemological dimension to be the following thesis (Mizrahi 2016a, p. 65): 
 
(AR) We should not believe that present scientific theories are approximately true. 
 
Again, the conclusion of Stanford’s NIS is that we should not believe our best present (scientific) 
theories (see NIS-3). Along these lines, then, philosophical antirealism, for present purposes, is 
the view that we should not believe our present philosophical theories. My reductio against 
Stanford’s NIS, then, purports to show that, from the assumption that Stanford’s NIS is a cogent 
argument against scientific realism, it follows that we should not believe (AR). 
                                               
2 As an anonymous reviewer helpfully pointed out, there are some affinities between this reductio and paradoxes of 
self-reference in philosophy of logic, such as liar sentences and the like. See, e.g., Russell (1906). 
3 Sterpetti (2018, p. 5) refers to (SA) as a claim. Strictly speaking, however, (SA) is not a claim or a thesis. Rather, it 
is an argument as the indicator word “thus” indicates. That is, (SA) contains two claims, “scientific realism is not 
true” and “scientific theories are not (approximately) true,” and the conclusion indicator “thus” suggests that the 
latter is supposed to follow from the former. 
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Second, contrary to what Sterpetti (2018, p. 5) seems to think, my argument against 
Stanford’s NIS is a reductio, not a dilemma. This is made clear in my (2016a) by the following: 
 
● I explicitly say that my argument against Stanford’s NIS is a reductio (Mizrahi 2016a, p. 
59, p. 63). 
● The main section of the paper Sterpetti engages with is titled “A reductio against 
Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science” (Mizrahi 2016a, p. 63). 
● The dilemma Sterpetti refers to is discussed in the “Objections and Replies” section of 
the paper as a reply to a potential objection to premise (6) of my reductio, not the main 
argument of the paper. 
 
Accordingly, the problem that my reductio poses for the Stanfordite is not that he has to choose 
between two equally undesirable options (the two horns of a dilemma), but rather that he has to 
deal with an absurd consequence of his own argument against scientific realism, namely, that his 
own argument entails that he should not believe his own brand of scientific antirealism. As I put 
it in the paper, “scientific antirealists who endorse Stanford’s New Induction on the History of 
Science cannot accept (7), since (7) says that they should not believe their own position” 
(Mizrahi 2016a, p. 64). 
 
Third, Sterpetti (2018, p. 4) seems to think that the following is a step in my argument 
against Stanford’s NIS: “it is possible to adopt Stanford’s own line of reasoning in the field of 
philosophy.” But this is mistaken. The issue is not whether it is possible to construct an inductive 
argument over the history of philosophy along the lines of Stanford’s NIS. Rather, the point is 
that the Stanfordite must grant that such an argument applies to the history of philosophy just as 
it applies to the history of science. Recall that the rationale for the NIS, as Stanford (2006, p. 19) 
himself says, is the PUA. But the PUA applies to philosophy as well, in the form of the PUO. 
That is: 
 
In much the same way that “the history of scientific inquiry itself offers a straightforward 
rationale for thinking that there typically are alternatives to our best theories equally well 
confirmed by the evidence, even when we are unable to conceive of them at the time” 
(Stanford 2006, p. 20), the history of philosophical inquiry offers a straightforward 
rationale for thinking that there typically are serious objections to our best philosophical 
theories, even when we are unable to conceive of them at the time (Mizrahi 2014, p. 426; 
emphasis in original).4 
 
Since “the PUO is just the PUA applied to philosophy rather than to science” (Mizrahi 2014, p. 
428), it follows that, if a Stanfordian new induction over the history of science is a cogent 
inductive argument, then a parallel new induction over the history of philosophy is a cogent 
inductive argument as well. Indeed, Stanford himself sometimes puts the PUA and the NIS in 
general terms that can be applied to both science and philosophy. For instance, according to 
Stanford (2006, p. 44): 
 
                                               
4 See also Mizrahi (2016a, pp. 61-62) and Mizrahi (2016b). 
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the problem of unconceived alternatives and the new induction suggest not that present 
theories are no more likely to be true than past theories have turned out to be, but instead 
that present theorists are no better able to exhaust the space of serious, well-confirmed 
possible theoretical explanations of the phenomena than past theories have turned out to 
be (emphasis added). 
 
Of course, insofar as philosophers are also theorists, the PUA applies to them as well. That is, 
philosophers, too, are no better able to exhaust the space of serious, well-defended possible 
theoretical explanations of the phenomena than past philosophers have turned out to be. For 
these reasons, a Stanfordite who endorses the PUA and the NIS is thereby committed to the PUO 
and the NIP as well. Given that the conclusion of the NIP is that we should not believe our 
present philosophical theories, the Stanfordite finds himself in the absurd position of having to 
say that, by his own lights, he should not believe his own philosophical theory about science. 
 
For this reason, it is not clear to me why Sterpetti (2018, p. 13) thinks that my argument 
against Stanford’s NIS (properly understood as a reductio) is “unfair” to Stanford (2006). 
Sterpetti (2018, p. 13) claims that 
 
By developing [the NIP], Mizrahi (quite unfairly) tries to equate Stanford’s scientific 
anti-realism, which is a sophisticated and well developed philosophical position [...] with 
a not well developed metaphilosophical position, labeled ‘philosophical anti-realism’. 
 
But he does not say why my reductio argument against Stanford’s NIS is “quite unfair.” Nor 
does he say why (and in what respects) Stanford’s brand of scientific antirealism is a more 
sophisticated and well developed position than a parallel sort of antirealism applied to 
philosophy. Of course, I neither defend nor endorse philosophical antirealism, or philosophical 
realism for that matter, as Sterpetti (2018, p. 15) erroneously thinks, which is why Section 4, 
titled “A Stanford-Like Argument Against Mizrahi’s ‘Philosophical Realism’,” and Section 5, 
titled “What if One Accepts Mizrahi’s Argument?” of his paper are red herrings. After all, my 
(2016a) is about the scientific realism debate, specifically Stanford’s PUA and the NIS, not 
metaphilosophy. Indeed, it looks like Sterpetti (2018, p. 20) himself suspected as much, for he 
says that it could be that I simply see philosophical realism “just as a part of the argumentative 
strategy that [I] develop against Stanford’s [NIS].”5 
 
Likewise, contrary to what Sterpetti (2018, p. 13) seems to think, I (Mizrahi 2016a, pp. 
63-64) neither endorse nor am committed to the NIP. Sterpetti (2018, p. 13) claims that 
 
The problem is that Mizrahi’s argument against Stanford’s [NIS] crucially relies on [the 
NIP]. Now, it is [the NIP] which is a blatantly self-defeating argument [...]. Indeed, if one 
maintains [the NIP], one is clearly advocating for a philosophical position, i.e. one is 
committing oneself to a given philosophical theory, namely the philosophical theory 
                                               
5 Sterpetti (2018, p. 13) seems to have misinterpreted philosophical antirealism as well, for he writes that 
philosophical antirealism is the view “according to which philosophical theories are not true, simpliciter.” This is 
mistaken. Philosophical antirealism is a view parallel to scientific antirealism. Given that scientific antirealism is the 
view that we should not believe that our present scientific theories are true, philosophical antirealism is the view that 
we should not believe that our present philosophical theories are true. 
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according to which we should not believe philosophical theories. But according to [the 
NIP] itself, we should not trust philosophical theories, so, [the NIP] is self-defeating. 
 
Sterpetti erroneously thinks that I am committed to the NIP because he has misconstrued my 
argument against Stanford’s NIS. As mentioned above, my argument against Stanford’s NIS is a 
reductio, not a dilemma, as Sterpetti (2018, p. 15) erroneously thinks. Once this confusion is 
cleared up, it becomes clear that I am not committed to the NIP. The NIP follows from the 
assumption (for reductio) that Stanford’s NIS is a cogent argument against scientific realism (see 
steps 1-3 of the reductio outlined in Section 1). Clearly, when one advances a reductio against p, 
one is not thereby committed to all the unacceptable or absurd consequences that follow from 
assuming that p is true (Marcus 2018, pp. 185-186). Just as Sterpetti (2018, p. 11) is not 
committed to what he takes to be the absurd consequences that follow from assuming what he 
wants to argue against by reductio, namely, from assuming that scientific realism is true, I am 
not committed to what I take to be the absurd consequences that follow from assuming what I 
want to argue against by reductio, namely, from assuming that Stanford’s NIS is a cogent 
argument against scientific realism.6 My reductio against Stanford’s NIS, if sound, shows that 
the assumption that Stanford’s NIS is a cogent argument against scientific realism has the 
consequence that NIP is a cogent argument against philosophical realism. Since the Stanfordite 
endorses the NIS as a cogent argument against scientific realism, he must grant that the NIP is a 
cogent argument against philosophical realism. But this leads to a consequence that the 
Stanfordite cannot accept, namely, that he should not believe his own brand of scientific 
antirealism. Clearly, this is an absurd position for a scientific antirealist like the Stanfordite to be 
in.7 
 
In that respect, it is important to point out that, as I have argued elsewhere, historical 
inductions, both old, such as Larry Laudan’s pessimistic induction (Mizrahi 2013a), and new, 
such as Stanford’s NIS (Mizrahi 2015), are weak inductive arguments. The problems with these 
historical inductions are that they tend to commit the fallacy of biased statistics (Park 2011), they 
are based on unrepresentative samples (Fahrbach 2011), and the inductive samples they are 
based on are typically cherry-picked rather than randomly selected (Mizrahi 2013a). So, unless 
these historical inductions can be improved significantly by following stricter procedures of 
random sampling and inductive reasoning (see Mizrahi 2016b; 2016c), I would not endorse such 
inductive arguments, whether the induction is over the history of science or the history of 
philosophy. 
 
                                               
6 According to Sterpetti (2018, p. 16), his reductio “arguments are not self-defeating arguments, they are arguments 
that merely point out that if one supports realism, then one should be able to face the objection conveyed by those 
arguments.” If Sterpetti is right about this point, then it should apply to my reductio as well, of course. My reductio 
against Stanford’s NIS is not self-defeating, as Sterpetti erroneously thinks, for it points out that, if one supports 
Stanford’s NIS, then one should face the objection conveyed by the PUO. 
7 At one point, Sterpetti (2018, p. 6) gets this right when he writes, “if one accepts Stanford’s argument against 
scientific realism, one has to accept Mizrahi’s Stanford-like argument for the field of philosophy as well.” Clearly, I 
do not accept Stanford’s NIS; after all, I argue against it. It is equally clear that Stanford accepts his own NIS; after 
all, it is his own argument against scientific realism. Now, if Stanford accepts his own NIS, which he clearly does, 
then he must accept the NIP, for, as Sterpetti himself points out, “if one accepts Stanford’s [NIS], one has to accept 
[the NIP] as well” (Sterpetti 2018, p. 6). 
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Finally, Sterpetti (2018, p. 5) also misconstrues my argument against Stanford’s NIS 
when he writes, “in Mizrahi’s view, since SP is an anti-realist stance, then because of this very 
fact it is self-defeating.” This is mistaken. It is not the mere fact that Stanford’s NIS is an 
argument for scientific antirealism that makes it self-defeating.8 Rather, given the parallels 
between Stanford’s PUA and the PUO, as well as those between Stanford’s NIS and the NIP, one 
could run an induction over the history of philosophy that is analogous to Stanford’s induction 
over the history of science. Since the Stanfordite accepts the latter as a cogent argument against 
scientific realism, he must grant that the former is a cogent argument against philosophical 
realism as well. Granting that, however, means that he should not believe his own philosophical 
theory about science, i.e., his own brand of scientific antirealism, by his own lights.9 
 
3. Setting the record straight: inductive vs. deductive arguments 
 
As mentioned above, Sterpetti (2018, p. 15) thinks that I have misinterpreted Stanford’s NIS. 
Sterpetti claims that Stanford’s NIS is not an inductive argument at all. Rather, it is a deductive 
argument, specifically, “a reductio against scientific realism” (Sterpetti (2018, p. 6).10 
 
There are several problems with Sterpetti’s interpretation of Stanford’s NIS as a reductio 
instead of an induction over the history of science. First, it goes against what Stanford himself 
says about his argument. As mentioned above, Stanford himself characterizes his NIS as an 
inductive argument. I have presented textual evidence for this in Section 1. Here is another quote 
from Stanford (2006, p. 19) to that effect: 
 
I suggest that the historical record offers plainspoken inductive testimony to the fact that 
we have repeatedly occupied a predicament of recurrent, transient underdetermination 
across a wide and heterogeneous variety of scientific fields and domains of inquiry 
simply because we have failed to conceive of all the empirically inequivalent but 
scientifically serious alternative theoretical possibilities well confirmed by the evidence 
available to us (emphasis added).11 
 
Second, it goes against how other philosophers of science have interpreted Stanford’s NIS (see, 
e.g., Magnus 2010, Wray 2015, and Park 2018, pp. 68-70). But perhaps these philosophers of 
science, and even Stanford himself, are wrong. Perhaps Sterpetti is right that Stanford’s NIS 
should be construed as a deductive (specifically, a reductio), not an inductive, argument. 
 
                                               
8 In fact, I point out in a footnote (Mizrahi 2016a, p. 64, footnote 2) that, “for this reductio to go through, there is no 
need to assume that Stanford’s [NIS] is an argument for antirealism (in particular, his own brand of antirealism, 
namely, “epistemic instrumentalism”). All that needs to be assumed is that, at the very least, Stanford's [NIS] is 
supposed to be an argument against scientific realism” (emphasis in original). 
9 Sterpetti (2018, p. 21) claims that “the great majority of philosophers does not think that philosophical theories are 
true in the same sense in which scientific theories are true,” but he does not explain these different senses of truth. 
Nor does he provide any evidence in support of this claim about what most philosophers think. 
10 After he says that “Stanford’s argument can be reconstructed as a reductio against scientific realism” (Sterpetti 
2018, p. 8), Sterpetti goes on to give another “formulation of the problem of unconceived alternatives [which] is not 
inductive in character,” but is not a reductio (Sterpetti 2018, p. 9). It is not clear to me if he sees these two 
formulations as equivalent, related, or neither. 
11 See also Stanford (2017). 
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I do not think so. The reason is that there is no clear payoff for doing so. Of course, any 
inductive argument can be turned into a deductive argument with the addition of suitable 
premises. For example, the following is an inductive argument: 
 
Past scientists typically have been men. 
Therefore, this scientist is a man. 
 
This is an inductive argument because the premise is not supposed to provide conclusive support 
for the conclusion. Rather, the premise, if true, is supposed to render the conclusion more 
probable or likely to be true. Like any argument, one could ask whether the premise, if true, 
really would make the conclusion more probable or likely to be true. In this case, one would be 
concerned with the strength of the inference from the premise to the conclusion. One could also 
ask whether the premise is in fact true. In that case, one would be concerned with the cogency of 
the argument. 
 
Now, this inductive argument can easily be turned into a deductive argument by adding a 
premise that would make the conclusion follow necessarily from the premises. 
 
If past scientists typically have been men, then this scientist is a man. 
Past scientists typically have been men. 
Therefore, this scientist is a man. 
 
Now this argument is deductive, in particular, it takes the logical form modus ponens. But what 
have we gained by turning this argument from an inductive into a deductive argument? Nothing, 
it seems, for we still have to deal with the same questions, only now we are concerned with the 
truth of the premises rather than the strength of the inference. That is, as far as the inductive 
version of the argument is concerned, we want to know if the truth of “past scientists typically 
have been men” really does make it more likely that “this scientist is a man” is true. As far as the 
deductive version of the argument is concerned, we want to know whether “if past scientists 
typically have been men, then this scientist is a man” is in fact true. Although our focus has 
shifted from examining the strength of the inference to examining the truth of the premises, it is 
not clear that we have gained anything, as far as deciding whether we should accept the 
conclusion of the argument, by doing so. Anyone who is not inclined to accept the conclusion of 
the inductive version of the argument is unlikely to be convinced by the deductive version of the 
argument, either. 
 
This point applies to Sterpetti’s attempt to reinterpret Stanford’s NIS as a deductive 
argument (specifically, a reductio). As far as the inductive version of Stanford’s NIS is 
concerned, we want to know whether the inference from NIS-1 to NIS-2 is strong. That is, 
assuming, for the sake of argument, that the historical record really does show that past scientists 
typically failed to conceive of alternatives to their favorite, then-successful theories, does that 
make it more likely that present scientists fail to conceive of alternatives to their favorite, now-
successful theories?12 As far as Sterpetti’s deductive version of Stanford’s NIS, our focus shifts 
from examining the strength of the inference to examining the truth of the premises. The 
                                               
12 For more on this question, see Mizrahi (2015). 
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premises in Sterpetti’s (2018, p. 11) reconstruction of Stanford’s NIS as a reductio are the 
following: 
 
Premise 1: “History of science shows that scientific theories routinely changed at time t + 
1 (¬a) in ways that might had been conceived by scientists at time t, but scientists 
routinely failed to conceive at time t (¬b).” 
 
Premise 2: “We do not have reasons to claim that cognitive abilities of current scientists 
changed so that they are now able to conceive all the possible alternatives to a given 
theory T at time t, and so that they cannot fail to know whether T is true at time t, and 
whether T is going to change at time t + 1.” 
 
Premise 3: “[Premise 1] and [Premise 2] are observed patterns that can be theoretically 
explained as follows: we have reason to believe that T has unconceived alternatives, 
unless we are able to prove that T has no unconceived alternatives. Since providing 
reason to believe that T has no unconceived alternatives is impossible, we are not able to 
know whether T is true at time t, and whether T is going to change at time t + 1.” 
 
There is a lot to unpack here and my space is limited. But it should be clear that these premises 
are far from being obviously true. As far as Premise 1 is concerned, it is far from obvious that, in 
general, scientific theories routinely change. Some scientific theories and theoretical posits are 
quite stable and have been around for more than two centuries (Mizrahi 2016c). Also, how much 
does a scientific theory have to change such that it becomes difficult (impossible?) to conceive at 
a particular point in time? 
 
As far as Premise 2 is concerned, it is far from obvious that scientists must be “able to 
conceive of all the possible alternatives to a given theory T” (Sterpetti 2018, p. 11) before they 
can be confident that the theory counts as scientific knowledge. Sterpetti seems to be making a 
few unreasonable assumptions about scientific knowledge here.13 Sterpetti seems to think that 
the alternatives in the PUA refer to logical possibilities. On Sterpetti’s view, then, in order to 
know that there is something like dark energy, say, I have to eliminate all logical possibilities, 
including the one according to which “the universe is accelerating because God is blowing wind 
on galaxies” (Mizrahi 2016a, p. 62). As I explain in that same paper, however, unconceived 
alternatives are not mere logical possibilities (Mizrahi 2016a, p. 62). To equate unconceived 
alternatives with mere logical possibilities, as Sterpetti does, is to turn Stanford's PUA “from a 
probability claim, which is supposed to be backed up by the historical record, to a mere 
possibility claim, and thus [Stanford’s NIS] becomes a conceivability argument about what is 
merely possible rather than an inductive argument about what is probable” (Mizrahi 2015, p. 
144). The problem with that, of course, is that, just as it is logically possible that p, it is equally 
logically possible that not p. Indeed, Stanford himself says that an unconceived alternative is not 
merely a logical possibility, but rather a competing theory that is “well confirmed by the body of 
actual evidence we have in hand” (Stanford 2006, p. 18). That is why “the hypothesis that the 
                                               
13 Throughout his paper, Sterpetti (2018) frequently uses terms and phrases like “prove” (p. 10), “certainty” (p. 7), 
“know with certainty” (p. 9), and the like. This suggests that he might have unreasonably high standards for not only 
scientific knowledge but also knowledge in general. For once one demands certainty as a requirement for 
knowledge, many claims to knowledge, not only scientific ones, fall into question. 
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universe is accelerating because God is blowing wind on galaxies is not an unconceived 
alternative to the dark energy hypothesis because it is not confirmed (let alone well confirmed) 
by the body of actual evidence we have in hand” (Mizrahi 2015, p. 138). On the other hand, “the 
Tychonic system was an empirically viable alternative, not merely a logical possibility, and 
hence a serious contender and a serious objection to the heliocentric model” (Mizrahi 2016a, p. 
62). 
 
As far as Premise 3 is concerned, once the confusion about unconceived alternatives is 
cleared up, it is far from obvious that there are always reasons to think that, for any theory T, 
there are always unconceived “equally well-confirmed and scientifically serious alternatives” 
(Stanford 2006, p. 44). Excluding mere logical possibilities, how many “equally well-confirmed 
and scientifically serious alternatives” (Stanford 2006, p. 44) are there to theories of inheritance, 
or electricity, or magnetism? A few (Mizrahi 2015), but certainly not so many as to make it 
impossible to justifiably believe (though not “prove” in the strict sense, as Sterpetti seems to 
demand) that T has no “equally well-confirmed and scientifically serious alternatives” (Stanford 
2006, p. 44).14 
 
In light of the above, then, it is not clear what Sterpetti has gained from turning 
Stanford’s NIS from an inductive argument over the history of science to a deductive argument 
(specifically, a reductio). Instead of asking questions about the strength of the inference, we 
would simply be asking questions about the truth of the premises. At bottom, however, these 
questions are basically the same sort of questions; that is, questions about the lessons we should 
draw from the historical record of science. Consequently, even if “criticisms based on the 
weakness of inductive inferences can be avoided by Stanford” (Sterpetti 2018, p. 12), if Sterpetti 
is right that Stanford’s NIS should be construed as a deductive argument, these criticisms would 
simply be recast as criticisms directed against the premises instead of the inference. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
After setting the record straight regarding Stanford’s NIS (it is an inductive, not a deductive, 
argument), my argument against Stanford’s NIS (it is a reductio, not a dilemma), I would like to 
make one more clarification in closing. Sterpetti concludes his (2018) by claiming that I have 
failed in “defend[ing] philosophical realism” and in “supporting scientific realism” (Sterpetti 
2018, p. 21).15 This is not surprising, of course, because the aim of my (2016a) is neither to 
defend philosophical realism nor to support scientific realism. As mentioned above, 
philosophical antirealism (i.e., the view that we should not believe our present philosophical 
theories) is simply a position parallel to scientific antirealism (i.e., the view that we should not 
believe our present scientific theories) that I use as an argumentative device in my reductio 
argument against Stanford’s NIS. In my (2016a), I neither defend it nor am I committed to it. 
                                               
14 Like Stanford (2006), Rowbottom (2016), which Sterpetti (2018) cites with approval, also uses the term “serious” 
when talking about unconceived alternatives. In that respect, it should also be noted that, to Rowbottom’s list of 
unconceived things, like observations and models, one could easily add objections, as in the PUO (Mizrahi 2014; 
2016a). 
15 Sterpetti (2018, p. 20) claims that, “if one regards [Mizrahi’s reductio against Stanford’s NIS] as a cogent 
argument, one cannot avoid committing oneself to ‘philosophical realism’.” But I do not see how a commitment to 
philosophical realism is supposed to follow from my reductio against Stanford’s NIS and Sterpetti does not explain 
how or why he thinks that. 
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Moreover, I am not a scientific realist, either, and I do not attempt to defend or support 
scientific realism in my (2016a). In fact, I say so explicitly: “my aim in this paper is not to 
defend scientific realism, but rather to expose what I take to be problems with Stanford's [NIS]” 
(Mizrahi 2016a, p. 66). Sterpetti must have assumed that, if I argue against scientific antirealism, 
I must be a scientific realist. But this is a false dichotomy, if only because there are numerous 
versions of scientific realism, as well as views in between scientific realism and antirealism, in 
the literature.16 Indeed, I take my own view to be a middle-ground position between scientific 
realism and antirealism because “it acknowledges the antirealist’s point that theory evaluation is 
comparative while, at the same time, retaining the realist’s optimism about science’s ability to 
get closer to the truth” (Mizrahi 2013b, p. 402). 
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